Images of violence have marked the political landscape of southern
Indeed, many of the problems resulting from events often described as civil unrest -or civil wars -in southern Africa are reflections of political choices involving several political actors who are almost forgotten today. In an interview given in 2010 to Rádio Moçambique, Joaquim Chissano 2 stated, in relation to conflicts following independence, that the real causes for the war of destabilisation that started in 1976 are the same ones that made Portuguese colonialism resist the independence of Mozambique.
[…] The war of destabilisation in Mozambique resulted from the failure in the dialogue attempts between the liberation movements of neighbouring countries with the -by then -minority regimes of Ian Smith, in Southern Rhodesia, and of apartheid, in South Africa. 3 Why was Alcora established? Who benefited from it? Documents recently uncovered add new data regarding southern Africa's recent past. Taking into account narratives about wars as active constructions of meaning, this research draws on contemporary documents, personal accounts, secondary works and recorded interviews.
White Collaboration in Southern Africa
The end of the Second World War was soon followed by the Cold War division of the world into two major blocs: the West, led by the USA and supported after 1949 by allies in NATO, and the East, led by the Soviet Union and supported after 1955 by its allies in the Warsaw Pact. Communism was by then seen by the USA as a real threat to the western way of life, a perception shared by the European colonial powers and South Africa. 4 The three signatories of the Alcora alliance not only shared a common interest -to maintain southern Africa under white control -but also saw themselves as the defendants of the last frontier of western civilisation in a continent in grave danger of being conquered by international communism.
In the 1950s and 1960s, independence was granted to French, British and Belgian colonies in Africa. The white-ruled Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland also had at this time extensive interests in several countries of the region, especially in Katanga province of the former Belgian Congo. 5 Afraid of losing the Federation's influence and economic interests in Katanga, Sir Roy Welensky, its prime minister , pursued an alliance with Katanga's whites and Belgian mining interests following the withdrawal of Belgium from the Congo in 1960. He also sought to cultivate the support of the UK and the USA by arguing that any form of white control in southern Africa would greatly assist the fight against African nationalism, which he asserted was Soviet-controlled. Britain, however, showed little enthusiasm for supporting a white-controlled region, thus prompting him to initiate an alternative defence strategy involving the Portuguese, NATO allies of the British. 6 As Hughes points out, even before 1963 the Rhodesian secret service was already forging links with both Portuguese Africa and South Africa, including extra-territorial Federation-Portuguese joint operations in places such as Dar es Salaam. 7 White-ruled Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain in 1965 marked a reversal of this trend towards decolonisation, and this event would come to play a major role in the evolution of a white political project for southern Africa. Settlers' fears of an advancing African nationalism, supported by Soviet communism, combined with lack of support from Britain, were key factors in the election of a hard-line Rhodesian Front government in 1962.
8 Rhodesian resolve to resist this perceived African nationalist-'communist' onslaught was strengthened in 1964 by the leadership of Prime Minster Ian Smith, whose UDI a year later can be seen as a key turning point for the white communities' control strategies for southern Africa. 9 South Africa's 'official' collaboration with Portugal, supposedly against the threat of communist expansion, can be traced as far back as 1955, when an informal proposal was presented by the foreign minister of South Africa, Eric Louw, to the Portuguese ambassador regarding common interests in sub-Saharan Africa.
10 This proposal envisaged a gathering of representatives from the governments of Belgium, France, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the Union of South Africa in order 'to exchange views and make proposals for future actions'. 11 For Portugal, such co-operation was perceived to be highly beneficial, although some reservations arose about an open collaboration with South Africa. The Portuguese authorities opted, first, for a careful analysis of its potential impacts through proper diplomatic channels. Only afterwards would an international conference be considered. 12 Nevertheless, from as early as the late 1940s, the strategic presence of international capitalist interests and economic co-operation in southern Africa was becoming all too evident. In Mozambique, the USA had plans to make Nacala the harbour for its 7th Fleet, in order to patrol the maritime traffic in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, Gulf Oil 13 had held the concession for natural gas and oil prospecting since 1948, and multinational corporations, such as Hurst International and Oppenheimer/Elf, were established in the territory. In Angola, in the 1960s, Gulf Oil initiated oil extraction in Cabinda, and the Compagnie française des pétroles (French Petroleum Company), Texaco and Petrangol 14 were joined by the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, all of which were investing strongly in the Angolan oil sector. In addition, Krupp, the German steel and armaments manufacturer, invested in iron exploration in Cassinga.
A further element in economic co-operation and resource exploitation was initiated in 1964, when South Africa proposed the creation of a Southern African Common Market (SACOM), comprising South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana and Malawi. Furthermore, an agreement was signed between Portugal and South Africa for the construction of the Cahora Bassa dam in Mozambique and the development of the Cunene valley hydro-electric project in Angola. 15 These projects and financial endeavours clearly ensured that development strategies and regional integration would be based on a pre-existing colonial socio-economic structure in southern Africa that had to be protected at all costs.
With the outbreak of the nationalist armed struggles for independence in Portugal's African colonies in the early 1960s, 16 projects in which South African and international capital had invested in those colonies became increasingly at risk, and drastic measures had to be taken. 17 To consolidate its vision for the region, South Africa, the region's political and economic leader, began strengthening relations with Ian Smith's Rhodesia and Salazar's 18 Angola and Mozambique. Their secret services, South Africa's Bureau of State Security (BOSS), Portugal's Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (PIDE) and Rhodesia's Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), 19 initiated co-operation in the identification of 'problematic' political movements, and began arresting individuals who represented a threat to their political projects. Different possible scenarios had to be studied, but Portugal always insisted on discussing these measures in secrecy, so that co-operation could be officially denied if the country was to be questioned about it. Salazar's Portugal had no intention of becoming publicly associated with apartheid South Africa.
From the 1960s, South Africa attempted repeatedly to sign an agreement with Portugal that would include the possibility of intervening in Portuguese-ruled Angola and Mozambique. For South Africa, its future and that of Rhodesia were perceived to be inter-connected with the way Portugal would conduct and ultimately win the war against African nationalists in these territories. Telegrams exchanged between the Portuguese embassy in Pretoria and the Portuguese ministry of foreign affairs reveal the Portuguese conviction that South Africa and Rhodesia considered their territories in Africa as 'their own flanks', and that the South Africans and Rhodesians would intervene in those territories 'whether we want it or not, in case our own defence proves incapable of sustaining the attack'. 20 For Portugal, that was reason enough for an agreement to be urgently considered; otherwise it could mean that South African and Rhodesian operations could be conducted in Portuguese colonial territories without prior approval by Portuguese authorities. Later, in 1961, the South African foreign minister, Eric Louw, stated publicly that in order to preserve 'western civilisation' in the 'dark continent', South Africa would have to co-operate with the Rhodesian and Portuguese authorities.
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Reports of a white alliance 22 began reaching the wider public in the early1960s. In 1963, the Portuguese Governor of Angola drew Portugal's attention to the advantages of constituting a united front in both Angola and Mozambique alongside Rhodesia and South Africa. 23 To the Portuguese, this was vital, due not least to the possibility of making use of more and better resources, including military vehicles, planes, ammunition and military technology, as well as the possibility of conducting joint actions with South African and Rhodesian troops, who would augment the meagre resources of the Portuguese army. In 1963, the Portuguese leader, Salazar, wrote to the South African prime minister, Hendrik Verwoerd, 24 emphasising the role of Portugal in the defence of western civilisation in southern Africa, and underlining that every form of co-operation with Portugal would be extremely welcome. In 1965, Franco Nogueira, the Portuguese minister of foreign affairs, caught between supporting the Rhodesian UDI and affronting its old ally, the UK, decided in favour of tacit support and concluded that Portugal could expect nothing from the UK. Portuguese support for the Smith government in Rhodesia was pragmatic, stopping just short of full diplomatic recognition of the Smith government by accepting its diplomatic mission in Lisbon as a 'legation', but not as an 'embassy', aware that if Rhodesia survived, Portugal would gain 250,000 white settler allies in southern Africa. 25 This reveals much about the strategies and interests of the Portuguese regime at the time, as it explored new alliances and disregarded older ones to defend the maintenance of its colonial territories in the continent. 26 Two years later, in March 1967, a note from General Câmara Pina, the Portuguese army chief of staff, to the South African authorities, highlighted Portugal's urgent needs for the defence of its African territories, including military equipment, vehicles, ammunition, radio sets and medicines. 27 By 1968, when Salazar was succeeded by Marcello Caetano, 28 the more enlightened sectors of the Portuguese regime had already understood that the regime itself would be endangered, since its own survival was linked to the autonomy of the Portuguese colonies in Africa. we find collaboration with Rhodesia indispensable to the defence apparatus for southern Africa, including, therefore, Portugal (Angola and Mozambique), South Africa and Rhodesia. It is too soon, nevertheless, to set alliances or military pacts in motion amongst these countries, so as not to arouse public opinion in those countries, though military agreements are growing tighter and in a better understanding. 33 Portugal, struggling to present itself as a multi-racial nation, technically ruling 'overseas provinces' rather than colonies, 34 had no wish to arouse adverse public opinion by joining a coalition with regimes identified as racist by the international community. Nevertheless, in its choice of allies, Portugal was effectively co-operating, even if with some reservations, with apartheid-ruled South Africa and white-minority-ruled Rhodesia.
Strongly worded UN resolutions and sanctions to end colonial rule had little practical effect in the region. The western powers, led by the USA, felt that they needed to keep southern Africa free of communist influence in the global struggle with the Soviet Union. 35 A 1948 top secret document from the US State Department, even if referring to Asia rather than Africa, had already made it clear that questions of human rights, justice and economic and social progress were quite secondary in the Cold War:
We need not deceive ourselves that we can afford today the luxury of altruism and world benefaction.
[…] We should cease to talk about vague and […] unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of living standards, and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better. 36 Southern Africa, with its natural resources and the strategic importance of the Cape sea route, was perceived to be much too important for the world economy, and the USA -as well as other western UN members, had an interest in keeping the region under western influence. 37 Bearing this in mind, it can be argued that, in spite of the American anti-colonial public rhetoric, a white southern Africa was instrumental both to its economic interests and as a bulwark against the communist threat. 38 Some authors give such importance to economic rationale that they even suggest that 'it is perhaps more correct to view the Soviet "threat" as a clumsy pre-emptive act of US imperialism to justify its aggressive policies'. 39 Nevertheless, as the report on Africa commissioned by Henry Kissinger 40 in 1976 argued, there was no hope that black Africans would gain political rights through violent means, and that western interests in Africa would necessarily have to be defended through alliances with the local white interests in the region.
Whites were in Africa to stay, and all solutions would have to pass through alliances with them in the region. 41 For Kissinger, apartheid-ruled South Africa had become a powerful ally in the Cold War confrontation, given the need to sustain a stable pro-western bastion in southern Africa. But, on the other hand, the American position had led to a political and military strengthening of African nationalist resolve. In accordance with the terms of the alliance signed between Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia, 42 their common enemy was also singled out as being African nationalist movements. 43 Therefore the US had come to be seen as a subtle accomplice in the white alliance's ambitions. 44 In a chapter concerning the alliances in southern Africa, Meneses and Martins point out that:
[c]onfrontations of power in this region of the world found a parallel in the geopolitical setting being designed there. For many, the Cold War is perceived as a system for peace maintenance between two worldwide factions, guided by the United States and the Soviet Union. Seen from this perspective, the history produced reveals itself filled with silences, as happens in what concerns the Third World.
[…] Well, the African settings were among the most devastated places by the violent conflicts of the last stage of the Cold War. In the southern African context, associated with the clash of ideologies […], several imperial projects were, likewise, in confrontation. 45 These western/white alliances were not without consequences. Other international connections and alliances were also being forged involving African liberation movements present in the region. The 1969 Lusaka Manifesto, for example, clearly stated that countries adjoining whiteruled states, as part of the obligations advanced by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), 'would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill'. 46 OAU members, led largely by nationalist leaders, supported the movements and organisations committed to nationalist struggles in southern Africa. By then, both armed struggle and negotiations appeared potential solutions to the struggles for an end to white minority rule. However, the conciliation being offered to South Africa by the OAU, in exchange for an acceptance of the one man, one vote principle, was declined and thus postponed in South Africa for another two decades. A contrary white political project was being forged for the region, and its consequent military component: Alcora. A radical new hope for white-ruled southern Africa was on the horizon.
Building a Military Strategy to Serve a White Political Project
Portugal and Rhodesia were already facing African nationalist insurgencies within their borders, with South African participation in Portuguese military actions in Angola since the 1960s. South Africa was, by then, the only country in such a position able to provide enough support to affect the course of the war. At the same time, it attempted to appeal to opinion in the so-called 'free world' in support of the construction of a pro-western, essentially whiteruled, bastion in southern Africa, thus frustrating communist inroads among African liberation movements. 47 This argument, given the Cold War scenario at that time, 48 was expected to gain some support from the west, and the definition of a common enemy seeking to overthrow minority regimes was what characterised co-operation between Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia. 49 The maintenance of good relations between South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonial administrations was, therefore, essential for the effectiveness of their counterinsurgency campaigns. As we have seen, since the mid 1960s these countries had been analysing the possibility of 'secret military pacts of mutual local assistance', 50 and bilateral economic alliances. Portugal, however, was also a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and it attempted to link its struggles against African nationalists with its wider anticommunist obligations as part of that alliance. 51 Since Ian Smith's UDI, Rhodesia had to deal with a growing number of commercial embargoes imposed by the UN. These sanctions left Rhodesia facing a shortage of oil, other basic products, and military equipment essential for security. 52 In 1967, South Africa, realising the importance of helping a neighbouring white regime, established a security co-operation plan and sent military and police support to Rhodesia to assist in the counter-insurgency, and was keenly concerned that guerrilla incursions included fighters from the African National Congress of South Africa. 53 Meanwhile, in Mozambique, guerrillas of the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo) nationalist movement began infiltrating Tete province from Tanzania, thus posing an acute threat south of the Zambezi river, including the provinces of Manica and Sofala, deep inside the territory. Rhodesia shared Portugal's concerns about these developments, 54 since this would allow joint actions between Frelimo and Zimbabwean nationalist forces. 55 In reaction to this, Rhodesia reinforced participation of its own forces in the Portuguese war effort in Mozambique, 56 assistance which Portugal greatly appreciated:
what happened in Zumbo [Tete province, close to the Rhodesian border] is nothing but proof of our efforts to repay the precious services rendered to Portugal by the Rhodesian Armed Forces in Tete, done in such a spirit of decision, efficacy and loyal collaboration that we can't help feeling for Rhodesia anything but the greatest friendship. Our struggle is similar and we, the Portuguese, are also fighting to rescue western civilisation from the barbarians threatening to subvert the world.
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Rhodesia was aware that the independence of Mozambique from Portugal would signal the end of its access to the sea through the Mozambican port of Beira. Even more threatening was the likely establishment of bases and other infrastructures supporting Zimbabwean nationalist movements with the consent and protection of an independent Mozambican government. Furthermore, the political implications of a guerrilla victory in Mozambique were enormous, both internationally and in the encouragement that this would give to African nationalists within Rhodesia. In sum, the possibility of the independence of Mozambique would mean the beginning of the end for Rhodesia, and it was in this atmosphere that negotiations were held for the white secret military and economic alliance.
To South Africa, as the leading regional power, Alcora would be of the utmost importance in helping to fulfil its politico-economic aspirations, 58 and it would allow South Africa to share responsibilities over the maintenance of their white project. As Davies argues, by means of a political alliance with other white regimes in the region, South Africa would be 51 Also in Guinea-Bissau, but this front falls beyond the scope of this article. [a]ble to rely on the existence of a ring of colonially ruled 'buffer states' to ensure that the gathering liberation struggle in southern Africa remained largely confined to regions far distant from its own borders, and that regional territories continued to serve South African capitalism as labour reserves, markets, and suppliers of specific services such as transport. 59 To the South African Defence Force (SADF), the strategy was to keep the defence line as far away as possible from South African borders. Thus Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia would become the northern front lines of South Africa's strategy. In March 1970, South African and Portuguese military high representatives met to analyse the common situation in southern Africa. At this meeting, South Africa drew attention to the rapid deterioration of Portuguese military control in eastern Angola, 60 while emphasising that this crisis should not be seen as isolated from other insurgencies in Mozambique, Rhodesia, South-West Africa and Caprivi. The Portuguese highlighted the fact that the wars they were fighting in southern Africa represented a mobilisation greater than one per cent of the total metropolitan population, 61 which was no easy task for a small, impoverished country. Portuguese and South African analyses revealed three fundamental concerns: the need for a permanent assessment of the threat evolution (information); the need for an assessment and co-ordination of human resources for the joint defence (general strategy); and the need for military forces' co-operation and joint use of infrastructures (military).
From the 1960s, the magnitude of the impact of decolonisation in the continent became increasingly significant, and South Africa was naturally very alert to these developments. It was felt that the time for radical action had arrived, due to an awareness of a developing pan-African nationalist alliance. As Lieutenant-General Fraser, commander-in-chief of the South African Joint Combat Forces, noted in a secret report from March 1970:
[i]n a conference conducted in Morogoro, Tanzania, between April 25th and May 1st 1969 by initiative of SAANC [ANC], the need was emphasized of strengthening the existing alliance between ZAPU (Rhodesia) and SAANC (RSA), through the inclusion of FRELIMO (Mozambique), of MPLA (Angola), 62 of SWAPO 63 (Southwest Africa and Caprivi) and of PAIGC (Portuguese Guinea) 64 with the aim of gathering each one's resources and create a solid liberation front, in the fight against imperialist white domination in Southern Africa. 65 Thus South Africa led the creation of a counter-revolutionary alliance. Alcora came to define unified strategies to confront a common enemy to South Africa and Rhodesia, which would support Portugal in the maintenance of military campaigns in the region. The fighting of three insurgencies 66 in Africa was proving too much of an effort for an impoverished country such as Portugal, which, by the end of the 1960s, had, after Israel, the highest proportion in the world of people in arms. 67 For Portugal, this alliance offered not only colonial survival but the endurance of its metropolitan regime.
The Alcora Exercise
Recently declassified archival material in Portugal provides new insights into how political and military co-operation between the three countries was strengthened, a process that reached its peak between 1970 and 1974. 68 In 1968, a meeting of the command of special operations from the three countries took place in Pretoria. The goal was to co-ordinate the development of counterinsurgency operations in southern Africa. 69 In April that year, as a result of an informal agreement between the Portuguese and South African military, two joint air support centres were created in south-east Angola, one in Cuíto-Cuanavale, the other in Gago Coutinho. In 1969, another meeting took place in Lisbon, 70 leading to the elaboration of a 'Plan for the Defence of Southern Africa'. 71 In these meetings, analyses were presented and important subjects were addressed, such as the impact of the menace, evaluation of tactics, combat execution regulations, intelligence, cartography, communications, equipment acquisition and psycho-social actions. On 14 October 1970, Alcora was signed by Portugal, South Africa and, shortly afterwards, Rhodesia. The organisational structure of the alliance 72 defined in these meetings consisted of a tripartite Alcora Top Level Commission (ATLC), an Alcora Co-ordination Commission (ACC), and eight sub-commissions, which were designed to meet on a regular basis twice a year. In 1971, a third meeting took place in Salisbury (now Harare), Rhodesia, a major outcome of which was the establishment of a joint consultative commission on information and security, in order both to face the common challenges and to organise joint strategies and operations. At a national level, each commission and subcommission had their own representation to guarantee the co-ordination of all Alcora commissions; to guarantee the contacts between member countries, the Portuguese created the Comissão de Coordenação para os Assuntos do Ultramar (CCAU -Overseas Co-ordination Commission).
At the core of these meetings was a persistent discourse about the struggle 'against terrorism and communism', identified as the major threats in the southern Africa region. 73 All Africans struggling for the independence of their countries from white rule became identified as terrorists supported by international communism. Thus, Alcora became essentially the military configuration of a South African political project 74 for securing and maintaining a white-ruled pro-western southern Africa.
It was not always possible for the alliance to function on the basis of equality. Portugal frequently had to surrender co-ordination of operations within its own African colonies to its allies. Although all shared a common interest -to keep southern Africa safe and under whiteruled regimes -they also had their own objectives and frustrations. As pointed out by Portuguese officers who fought in African theatres of war, 'the strategic priority given by Marcello Caetano to the alliance with Rhodesia and South Africa prevented any possibility of conducting the war in a different way from the one determined by its allies'. 75 Because of the complexity of the military situation and the interests involved, the alliance would always have primacy.
As a result of Alcora, Portugal also benefited from South African financial support. 77 Due to the political turmoil in Portugal, however, Portuguese military representatives attended the meeting only to put an end to the Portuguese presence in the tripartite alliance. Henceforth, all that remained of Alcora were the Rhodesian and South African strongholds and unofficial Portuguese movements still craving western support.
Thus, with the coup d'état in Portugal in 1974 and subsequent negotiations for a transition to independence, the white alliance suffered a final blow. The independence of Angola and Mozambique enabled the freedom fighters from Rhodesia -the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) -and those of SWAPO and the ANC to find other places to seek the shelter and support that allowed them to reorganise and challenge white minority-rule in Rhodesia and South Africa. 78 From the late 1960s, ZAPU guerrillas co-operated closely with guerrillas from the ANC's armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), in Rhodesia, 79 but it was after 1974 -in the post-détente era -that ZAPU would concentrate on guerrilla training, most of which took place in Tanzania, Zambia and Angola. 80 Strong bonds continued to be forged between freedom fighters from several territories, but this did not immediately halt Rhodesian and South African ambitions to secure their positions. Their aggression continued to be directed against Angola, invaded by South African troops in August 1975, which led the MPLA to ask for aid from Cuban forces. 81 Mozambique had to deal with major Rhodesian operations inside its territory in 1976, supported by the Rhodesianand South African-funded Resistência Nacional Moçambicano (Renamo), 82 as well as other front line states. 83 [t]he heritage of heavily armed, disciplined and militarised contingents of African troops left behind by the hasty Portuguese decolonisation process, together with varying but generally narrow integration conditions offered by the new independent regimes, are the two factors that undoubtedly created a bridge between the colonial wars and the civil ones after the independence, particularly in Angola and Mozambique. 90 The militarisation that these societies underwent during colonial campaigns bequeathed a legacy of violence beyond independence, which South Africa and Rhodesia continued to exploit. Another legacy of Alcora was their continuing ability to manipulate internal conflicts within liberation movements. Thus some African nationalists defected from their movements to create other liberation and political movements, often with local white or western support. In Angola, for example, Jonas Savimbi, leader of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), 91 initially accepted support from the Portuguese colonial authorities and later from apartheid South Africa in his fight against the MPLA government. Thus were sown the seeds for postcolonial internal conflict. In a modern version of 'divide and rule', the minds originally behind the project of a white-ruled southern Africa provided several African leaders, even before their countries became independent, with the weapons they could later use to maintain a cycle of violence for many years to come. 
